In 'The best book on Scottish history ever written' - Robert Bruce & The Community of the Realm Of Scotland, Professor Barbour dedicates a chapter to trying to asses the character of Robert Bruce, King of Scots.
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It is easy to strip away the legend surrounding some notable figure from the distant past, but clearing away the legend does not necessarily reveal the man. Nothing that has been stated as a fact about Bruce in the foregoing pages, nor any speech or writing attributed to him, is legendary in quality. But it must still remain doubtful whether we have come much nearer to the king's true personality. To some extent our view of Bruce will always depend on how much credence we give to Barbour. If we choose to ignore Barbour altogether, as we may, we shall be left with a jejune assortment of glimpses in record and chronicle, and a few authentic utterances. These might carry more weight than Barbour, but they would not add up to a portrait. Barbour is far from being legend, but we need to remember that for him Bruce was the hero of a work of art. Consciously or unconsciously, he emphasized the chivalrous qualities in Bruce, and in Douglas, his other hero. More seriously than this, he overemphasized the chivalrous qualities of the age in which Bruce and Douglas lived. It was an age in which a king of England was murdered with a red-hot iron plunged through his rectum into his bowels, in which two knights at the court of Philip IV, because of an affair with the king's daughters-in-law, were flayed alive - one of them having been extradited by Edward II for the purpose, much to the indignation (may it be said to their credit) of ordinary English people. It was, though not of course uniquely, an age of horrors, of brutality, of intrigue and squalor. Much of this Barbour passes over. He touches on the miseries, but he dwells on the splendours.
Nevertheless, on the score of general reliability Barbour must be reckoned a biographer, not a romancer. How much would we feel we knew of Dr Johnson were it not for Boswell? It would not be absurd to ask a similar question with regard to Bruce and Barbour. Of course, Barbour lacks the pages of dialogue recalled verbatim, the mass of convincing detail, which constitute the chief reason for reading Boswell and believing his portrait to be a very close approach to truth. But Barbour, though only a boy when Bruce died, was a most careful and exact recorder, especially of names, personalities, incidents and points of detail. We shall not be on unsafe ground if we accept Barbour's portrait of the king, even though we must correct it by more reliable evidence wherever that is necessary and possible. He shows us a man at once humane and kingly, generous and firm of purpose. Barbour was not often embarrassed by the need to excuse or explain away some act which detracted from his hero's stature. The execution of the burgesses at Perth in 1313 was played down by Barbour in the words 'bot thair wes few slayne', which were vague enough not to be untrue. The apparent fact that the king singled out the Scots for deterrent punishment, letting the English go free, is actually contradicted by Barbour's statement 'that thai war kynde to the cuntre he wist, and had of thame pite'. The king's refusal to intervene to save Sir David Brechin's life clearly troubled Barbour, and he passed rapidly on from this sorry business to tell an anecdote of Bruce's unusual generosity towards Sir Ingram de Umfraville. In these somewhat pathetic evasions or discomfitures of Barbour lies one of our surest pieces of evidence of Bruce's essential goodness.
The king's sense of humour comes out even in dry official documents, but is best remembered in his reply to the nobles who rebuked him for risking his life in the encounter with Sir Henry de Bohun at Bannockburn. His immense courage is attested by the whole of his career. Patience, on the other hand, he was forced to learn, yet once learned it became his most dominant characteristic. Men trusted his word and his judgements, so that decisions and laws made by him were respected and, in after years, invented in order to be respected. In a period when there were virtually no professionals, generalship was not of a high order. But modern military experts agree that Bruce's handling of Bannockburn was masterly. The secret of his success here lay in the fact that behind his tactical brilliance and superlative gifts of leadership Bruce had an exceptionally good grasp of strategy: he always knew what should take priority. Directly or indirectly, Barbour's portrait gives us these qualities. His terms of reference forbade him to write of shortcomings, such as the evident rashness and hot-headedness of Bruce's earlier years. Barbour hardly brings out Bruce's ambition, yet it cannot be doubted that from young manhood Bruce was determined to play a leading part. The truth about his submission to Edward 1 in 1302 has now been established in sufficient detail to disprove the old charges of treachery and double-dealing, yet the fact remains that Bruce did change sides two years in advance of his colleagues. Nothing but frustrated ambition will easily account for his conduct. Barbour also falls to mention, presumably because word and concept were alike lacking in his time, one of Bruce's greatest gifts, the imaginative quality of his mind which allowed him to be revolutionary in more than just the political sense.
Finally, we must return to Robert Bruce's kingliness. It was suggested earlier that the key to much of his conduct may be sought in the background, at once aristocratic and royal, in which his grandfather was brought up and lived out his long career. There is an unmistakable assurance about the manner in which Bruce assumed kingship even though he reached the throne by a revolutionary coup. Even his flight in the heather did not snuff out his claims to royalty, though the news of it inspired mocking ballads in England:' and became common gossip as far away as Italy.' The regia dignitas of Scotland was never in safer hands than those of King Robert 1. Barbour convincingly makes the magnates gathered at his deathbed mourn their lord as a great exponent of kingship and kingliness: 'for better governour than he mycht in na cuntre fundyn be'.
Let us look at two brief letters of which King Robert was at least the official author. They have not been mentioned earlier, and one was scarcely known at all until Professor Duncan brought it to light. The first was addressed to Edward II at some unknown date, the second to the kings and people of Ireland, probably in 1315, preparatory to Edward Bruce's expedition.
"To the most sincere prince, the Lord Edward, by God's grace illustrious king of England, Robert, by the same grace king of Scots, sends greetings in Him by whom the thrones of rulers are governed.
Since while agreeable peace prevails the minds of the faithful are at rest, the Christian way of life is furthered, and all the affairs of holy mother church and of all kingdoms are everywhere carried on more prosperously, we in our humility have judged it right to entreat of your highness most earnestly that, having before your eyes the righteousness you owe to God and to the people, you desist from persecuting us and disturbing the people of our realm, so that there may be an end of slaughter and shedding of Christian blood. Everything that we ourselves and our people by their bodily service and contributions of wealth can do, we are now, and shall be, prepared to do sincerely and honourably for the sake of good peace and to earn perpetual grace for our souls. If it should be agreeable to your will to hold negotiations with us upon these matters, let your royal will be communicated to us in a letter by the hands of the bearer of this present letter.
The king sends greetings to all the kings of Ireland, to the prelates and clergy, and to the inhabitants of all Ireland, his friends.
Whereas we and you and our people and your people, free since ancient times, share the same national ancestry and are urged to come together more eagerly and joyfully in friendship by a common language and by common custom, we have sent over to you our beloved kinsmen, the bearers of this letter, to negotiate with you in our name about permanently strengthening and maintaining inviolate the special friendship between us and you, so that with God's will our nation may be able to recover her ancient liberty. Whatever our envoys or one of them may on our behalf conclude with you in this matter we shall ratify and uphold in the future."
Does either of these letters give us the real Bruce? Are they, in the most personal sense, authentic, or are they both merely the products of an embryonic 'foreign office' with an eye to the main chance? In view of the extremely personal quality of royal government in the fourteenth century, it would probably be wrong to put these letters too far from the king himself At the very least they show two aspects of his policy, and give examples of his method of approach. There is no reason to suspect Bruce's sincerity in his professions of peace towards England, so long as it was peace between independent monarchies and not simply submission. And it seems typical that he should write direct to the only person who could take the initiative on the other side. If Professor Duncan is right in thinking that the letter to Edward II belongs to the period of the Declaration of Arbroath, possibly composed by the same author, then the seriousness of purpose underlying the Scottish king's appeal would be confirmed.
The letter to Ireland is a very different matter. The invasion of Ireland hangs over Bruce's career as a large question-mark. Some English historians dismiss it as nothing more than deliberate trouble-making, and dwell upon the horrors and miseries that followed from King Robert's perilous and futile march to Limerick and from the Scots' whole sojourn in Ireland between May 1315 and October 1318. One or two even contrive to suggest that this unique and short-lived Scottish invasion ended a halcyon period of Anglo-lrish harmony, and introduced a note of altogether unusual barbarity into the history of a nation which had hitherto been ruled and protected by the English Crown with motherly solicitude.
The question must nevertheless be asked, was Bruce's motive plain aggression, the sort of aggression upon which successful revolutionary nationalism so often embarks ? The affair hardly admits of any simple explanation. A powerful resurgence of Celtic tradition and Irish national feeling would have caused an explosion regardless of Scottish intervention. Behind the obvious propaganda appeal of Bruce's letter lay important truths. Scotland and Ireland did share in part a common ancestry and culture, and the Irish did yearn to be free of foreign rule. The example set by Bruce in his own kingdom was bound to be infectious, and it was understandable that some of the Irish leaders should fancy that an answer to all their pent-up aspirations lay in Edward Bruce and a few thousand veterans of Loudoun Hill, Brander and Bannockburn.
Equally, there is no doubt that contemporary observers, both in England and in Ireland, believed the Scots were bent on conquest. Their invasion threatened to wrest the lordship of Ireland totally from the control of the king of England and create a fresh kingdom of Ireland under a Scottish king, Edward Bruce. Moreover, in May 1315 when he crossed to Ireland to embark on his three-year adventure, it must have seemed well within the bounds of probability that Edward Bruce would succeed to the throne of Scotland. He was duly crowned king of Ireland at Dundalk about mid-June, 1315, obviously with the knowledge and acquiescence of his brother. Robert 1 had an acute awareness of the dangers of a hostile, of the value of a friendly, Ireland. For three years from 1315 a significant part of the military resources of Scotland (chiefly veteran commanders and soldiers, but also weaponry, shipping and supplies) was diverted to the Irish enterprise. Thomas Randolph was involved from the outset, and when the Scots invasion appeared to be penned within the borders of Ulster Randolph went back to Scotland to fetch reinforcements (December 1315) whose numbers enabled the invaders to penetrate as far south as north Leinster. Had the Scots intended merely to secure their western flank by neutralizing Ulster this southward push would be hard to explain. It is true that after outfacing, near Ardscull in Co. Kildare, an Anglo-lrish force weakened by rivalries and jealousies, Edward was compelled to withdraw northward again.`
Stalemate ensued, but instead of Robert I's deciding to cut his losses and abandon his brother to the common fate of so many invaders of Ireland he personally led an army of veterans to Ulster in January 1317, and in company with Edward and Randolph undertook a bold and dangerous operation, the aim of which was clearly to rouse the clans of central and southern Ireland in support of 'King Edward' and to amass sufficient forces to drive the English government out of Dublin. A winter of dearth and disease was not well chosen for this venture, which with hindsight seems more desperate than it may have appeared to those who were there. Save in Ulster, where a few families such as Mandevilles, Bissets and Logans fought on the Scottish side for some of the time, the Anglo-lrish opposed the Scots, only isolated dissidents like the Lacys of Meath or Gilbert de la Roche joining Bruce because of private quarrels. The Dublin administration, whether under Edmund Butler or more vigorously under Roger Mortimer, could afford to wait, making a Fabian virtue out of financial necessity. For the Scots everything depended on the Irish kings, greater and lesser, uniting in the common cause of Irish independence and being motivated by a shared enmity towards the English. But of this they were quite incapable. O'Neill merely excited jealousy, rival branches of the kingly family of Connacht could not both receive satisfaction from 'King Edward', and on the banks of the Shannon near Limerick the Scots army was confronted by a hostile Muirchertach O'Brien where they had hoped to find friends and allies. By May 1317 the king of Scots, his force decimated by sickness and hunger, judged it prudent to return home.
It has been said that 'when Robert [Bruce] sought the backing of "all the kings of Ireland", he was asking for a unity quite foreign to Gaelic Ireland'. It is not easy, however, to accept that the king of Scots was so naive, so ignorant of the truth about Irish society and politics, that the failure of the Irish kings or chiefs to rally behind his brother took him utterly by surprise. Robert I was a realist, born and brought up among people who knew Ireland well and, indeed, thoroughly at home in a region of Scotland, Carrick and Galloway, which must have resembled northern Ireland very closely. The establishment of his brother as king of Ireland would certainly have suited Robert I's book. If the English government was drawn into costly diversions of Irish resources which it would otherwise use against the Scots, if the English could be harried not only in Ireland itself but by an Irish-based invasion of north Wales, above all if the subjugation at least of Ulster could, along with the recovery of Man, secure for the Scots unchallenged command of the narrow seas between Ireland and Scotland, then a substantial, though not reckless, investment of ships, troops and leadership in Ireland would pay off.`
As for the long term, and the deeper implications, that seems a different matter. In the fifteen years between Bannockburn and King Robert's death he devoted a mere few months to personal interventions on Irish soil, and the Scots as a whole were active in Ireland for only three years. Had Ireland and its relations with England and Scotland been 'in the mainstream of Scottish policy, not regarded as a temporary diversion of it'," the Scots would surely have given Ireland closer and more continuous attention than appears to have been the case. This is not to say that King Robert did not take Ireland seriously. Geography alone would have guaranteed that the Irish situation could never be of temporary interest to Scotland. Bruce never forgot Scotland's Irish frontier. There was even a belief in Scotland (unsupported by any known evidence) that if only Edward Bruce had postponed the encounter with John Bermingham at Faughart (14 October 1318) 'till the morrow', his brother would have come to his aid with a large army. Improbable as this may seem, Bruce could not afford to let English power become firmly established in Antrim or Down. In the very last years of his life, although suffering from a crippling malady, he crossed to Ulster twice, first in 1327 to make sure that Edward III got no help from Ireland, and second, in the summer Of 1328, for an unknown purpose. There is absolutely no question that Scottish policy throughout Robert I's reign embraced the exercise of a decisive influence upon the situation in northern Ireland. But when it came to the notion of a 'Celtic empire' in the west, fulfilling in part the popular prophecies of Merlin, the Scots seem to have been opportunistic. It would be wrong to sentimentalize the relations of the two peoples. They made use of each other when it suited them, and since under Robert I the Scots were better organized, the advantage, as long as he lived, lay with them.
To the modern Scottish mind, largely Protestant or postProtestant, there is one element in Robert Bruce's nature which has seemed unfamiliar and unattractive and has consequently been omitted from standard and popular works, or played down. This is the king's piety and devoutness, especially his devotion to certain saints of the church. Perhaps he was in no way exceptional in this respect among the kings of his time. But one is left with a strong impression that religious feeling at this level had a much more dominant place in his life than in that of Edward II, even if it meant less to him than it had done to Henry III. Certainly no picture of the king would be complete if it did not take this into account. Bruce seems, for example, to have felt a special devotion towards Saint Fillan, one of the most renowned of the Scoto-lrish saints. He granted Fillan's chief church and sanctuary (Killin and Strathfillan) to Inchaffray Abbey, evidently with the intention that a daughter-house of Inchaffray should be founded at Strathfillan, and this daughter-house he endowed with land in Glendochart.